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THE RACE FACTOR AND TRIAL BY JURY
Kenneth Conboy *
The institution of trial by jury in criminal cases, one of the great
achievements in the history of civilization and a principal foundation
of our federal constitutional order, is today under challenge by two
different but interrelated developments in American courtrooms.
These developments played a crucial role in the public reaction to the
first Rodney King verdict and subsequent commentary upon the
jury's decision as a talisman of asserted deficiencies in the criminal
justice system at large.
The first development is a broad national imperative to eliminate
racism in all aspects of American legal, political and social life, including jury selection. The second is the heightened scrutiny that
electronic media presence is applying to the jury system. This scrutiny has been made possible by the watchful eye of television cameras
in criminal jury trials, provided by national cable programs such as
Court TV and network programs such as ABC Television's Nightline
and public television's McNeil/Lehrer Newshour.
These two novel developments in jury service, overt race factoring
in the selection and assessment of juries, and the development of the
juror as a potential media celebrity have all brought to the forefront
certain doubts about the American jury system. The former raises the
question of whether jurors focused on race can be even-handed and
function collegially as a judgment-giving unit for the whole community. The latter raises the question of whether the public at large will
accept and respect jury verdicts where individual jurors, unskilled at
self-expression in the pressured and often unfriendly environment of
post-trial media interrogation, sometimes appear self-serving, ignorant, malleable or incoherent.
The effect of these developments has been that the American trial
jury has become a subject of controversy to an extent not often seen in
the nation's history. The utility and fairness of the American trial
jury has been challenged on intellectual and moral grounds, and its
premise as a democratic and representative body has been questioned.
* United States District Court Judge in the Southern District of New York: B.A.,
Fordham College; J.D., Virginia Law School; M.A., Columbia University. The author
served as Trial Attorney, Chief of the Rackets Bureau, and Executive Assistant District
Attorney in the Manhattan District Attorney's Office. He also served as Deputy Commissioner and General Counsel to the New York City Police Department and was Commissioner of Investigation of the City of New York from 1985 to 1987.
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Its vulnerability to political, reportorial and attorney manipulation
based upon racial factors has been the subject of commentary and
critical inquiry. Its decisions have been freighted with the consequence or prospect of urban rioting, looting and violence. Finally, the
power of jury nullification, where verdicts are pronounced which are
adverse to the law and the facts, has invoked profound misgivings
about untrammelled jury power, particularly in cases involving criminal acquittals.
Trial by jury emerged during the late medieval period in England,
prior to broad centralization of judicial institutions during the reign of
Edward I, when the local peace was maintained by local land owners.
The local jury subjected the accused to judgment by his peers, but
peers who presumedly knew both him and his accusers well. It assured a verdict that acquired moral validity as a reflection of the community's conscience. Unanimity of the twelve was required in
pronouncing the verdict, one way or the other, on the theory that in a
matter of such grave public import, only complete consensus would
win the broad community support that is essential to any stable order
under the regimen of a rule of law. Bearing in mind that an institutionalized prison system did not arise in England until the nineteenth
century, and that capital punishment was exacted by law upon conviction for almost any felony crime, jury nullification was valued as an
essential mechanism for humanizing the criminal justice process.
In late twentieth century America, of course, the immense density
and diversity of most state counties and federal districts have imposed
a wholly different meaning on the concept of community, and placed
the English origins of trial by jury largely (though not entirely) beyond the relevance of the function of the American criminal trial jury.
Our jurors are now selected for service only upon a showing that they
are absolute strangers to the parties and the controversy, and that
they are completely ignorant of the incidents to be tried, even if those
events are subjects of tremendous national significance and pervasive
national fascination, as with the case of Colonel Oliver North. More
important, however, is the transformation of the jury from a body
which had historically emphasized unum in our national motto, to
one which now emphasizes pluribus.
The fate of the peremptory challenge, especially in the hands of a
criminal defendant, most dramatically mirrors that change. Peremptory challenges were eliminated in Great Britain in 1989 in an effort
to secure greater minority representation in criminal juries. Our
Supreme Court has restricted their use in order to prevent, to the
greatest extent possible, the exclusion of persons based upon racial
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characteristics where a pattern of exclusion emerges in the non-cause
challenge rounds. This noble endeavor is, however, fraught with a
new peril - that white jurors will get the notion that they represent
whites, black jurors represent blacks, Asian jurors represent Asians,
Hispanic jurors represent Hispanics, and so forth. It bears emphasis
that no defendant is entitled to a particular jury composition, only to
a process of selection which does not systematically exclude legally
protected groups from venue panels and jury pools. The subject of
race is volatile, and its overt introduction into the jury selection process can dramatically alter the chemistry of the body and undermine
the prospect for consensus without which the jury cannot succeed.
Outcomes in criminal trials may be affected, irrespective of the admitted evidence, by jury composition. This has been recognized by
trial lawyers in America and England for centuries. For example, it is
widely believed that women are less likely than men to convict in capital cases, that urban poor are less sympathetic to insurance companies than suburban upper middle-class property owners, and that
university professors are more suspicious of government authority
than civil servants. This being so, courts have always proceeded upon
the assumption that such biases, predilections or emotional dispositions can be exposed in a voir dire inquiry that is comprehensive, case
specific, and respectful of the complexities of both human attitudes
and the capacity of average people to express themselves about such
sensitive and personal matters in the heightened and stressful environment of a public courtroom.
The restriction on a defendant's use of peremptory challenges to
minimize the race factor in jury deliberation is a radical step. The
profound irony of this latest work of legal realism lies in the impediment it places against the minority defendant in the dock, perhaps on
a capital charge, who seeks a jury of his peers which through its verdict may take his liberty or his life. Under the new challenge rules,
which are founded at least implicitly on the theory that jury panels
are fertile fields for racial and ethnic trumping by opposing lawyers, a
black defendant cannot seek to nullify white prejudice by striking a
white juror sub-silentio in order to find a place for a black juror who
might cancel or expose in jury deliberations any white prejudice adverse to the defendant.
At the heart of this dilemma, of course, is the question of whether
racially diverse jurors can surmount their prejudices and reach a verdict based solely on the legally admitted evidence. This task is complicated in criminal trials, especially where the jurors live in a
neighborhood or city which is grievously afflicted by violent crime,
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where the defendants to be tried are charged with violent offenses or
drug trafficking, where their accusers are policemen (to whom most
citizens, including prospective jurors, look for protection against such
crime) and where the defendants are members of a minority group.
The principal cause of this is the centrality of crime as a pervasive and
intractable problem in American domestic life. The crime issue dominates the private lives and thinking of Americans to an extent exceeding any other concern. This reality has exacerbated racial bias, group
suspicion and division among neighbors; the criminal jury may, as an
institution, become enmeshed in these fractious and adversarial relations of the races.
As a consequence of this very real and troubling problem, and in
light of the Supreme Court's expressed constitutional concerns about
racial bias in jury selection, suggestions have come forth which require careful analysis. It has been urged by some minority spokespersons that structured multi-racial juries should be empaneled as a
matter of course, without regard to random drawing of names from
venire panels. Furthermore, the venire panels themselves are urged to
be restructured on a quota system. This proposal is predicated upon
the belief that individuals are decisively influenced in their important
life decisions by their backgrounds, social position and personal circumstances. Hence, it is expected that one's social class or economic
position will dictate the judgment to be decreed in the jury box.
For example, a stock broker will, all other things being equal, acquit a stock broker, an Asian will acquit an Asian, and a minimum
wage worker will acquit a minimum wage worker. Such crude, quasiMarxist theory cannot be taken seriously. Such a view is simply untenable, for example, in light of the broad responses of randomly selected New York juries to police witnesses and defendants of diverse
race and status. Jury impasse in New York occurs in only a small
fraction of cases committed to juries for decision, despite the fact that
a significant majority of police witnesses are white, a significant majority of defendants are members of minority groups, and all white
juries are statistically rare. While this may mean that New Yorkers as
a discrete group are uniquely even-handed while on jury duty, one
doubts that they have a disproportionate share of fair mindedness and
objectivity among citizens at large.
It is also argued, in profound misunderstanding of the nature and
function of jury deliberations, that a jury must mirror more precisely
the composition of the neighborhood or district from whence the defendant comes in order to secure a checks and balances dynamic out
of which debate, and ultimately the truth, can emerge. This sugges-
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tion implies that jury deliberation is a mechanism for the rationalization of biases, and that sectarian interests, candidly acknowledged and
pitched into an egalitarian stew, will produce a verdict palatable to
all. Truth will emerge, it is hoped, by folding into the deliberations
the jurors' own personal views about whether black defendants in
general are likely to be drug dealers and white policemen in general
are likely to be perjurers. Such ruminations are, of course, completely
improper and entirely irrelevant to the profoundly solemn proceedings to determine whether individual and unique human beings are
felons or liars.
Furthermore, any attempt to even facially approximate the racial
(and gender, national origin and sexual preference) composition of a
community in its jury boxes must ultimately fail in a society as diverse
and mobile as ours. We need only look to Florida's recent problems
in this regard to appreciate the difficulties that lie ahead for such efforts. When a Hispanic police officer shot two blacks in Miami and
three nights of rioting followed, a multi-racial jury convicted him of
manslaughter. An appeals court reversed the conviction on the
ground that the threat of further riots may have distracted and undermined the objectivity of the jury that found the officer guilty. The
court ordered the retrial to be held in a venue other than Miami. The
case first went to Orlando, but a substantially lower percentage
(though not an underrepresentation) of blacks in the jury pool caused
Miami blacks to denounce the transfer as an official rigging in favor of
the officer. The case then went to Tallahassee where the city, claiming a tense environment, evaded its responsibility to hear the case.
Tampa and Jacksonville have strong representations of potential
black jurors, but the officer's lawyer objected to an under-representation of Hispanic jurors, insisting that only Miami was viable, the specter of riots notwithstanding. One can sympathize with the daunting
problems confronting the judge, wherever he or she may be, in seeking and finding an impartial jury under such circumstances.
The
cardinal assumption of both the American and English justice system
in modern times has been that all citizens, regardless of race, religion,
class, ethnicity and nationality are entitled to sit in judgment of their
peers in an atmosphere free of personal bias or incompetence. A parallel assumption is that outcomes in jury verdicts turn overwhelmingly upon the evidence or lack of evidence in the trial record. The
trials of Daniel Berrigan and Marion Barry confirmed the soundness
of these assumptions. Father Berrigan was tried for destruction of
draft records in a period of tremendous political upheaval, where antiwar sentiment was widespread in the general population, and particu-
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larly in the urban areas of the northeast. His jury contained a woman
whose four sons were conscientious objectors on religious grounds to
the Vietnam War. She nonetheless voted for his conviction. The
Mayor of the nation's racially polarized capital boasted that all he
needed was one black juror to be acquitted, irrespective of the evidence. A jury containing numerous blacks voted unanimously to convict him.
But the more convincing confirmation of the inherent fairness of
American juries for this writer has come from observing and interacting with a long line of jurors encountered during ten years as a prosecutor and five years as a trial judge. When I entered my first criminal
case in October 1966, I had a very imperfect understanding of what
responsibilities awaited me. I knew, of course, that formal legal rules
would shape my actions as a public prosecutor. But it seemed almost
as if knowledge alone was all one needed to achieve the just result,
and that the law would deliver a clean, precise and impersonal resolution in every case if one could find the right rule and apply it intelligently. So too with evidence, which I thought in most cases would
simply speak for itself, to one end or the other. This is a common
misconception of those newly sent forth from law schools. This view,
however, takes no account of the human dimension involved in the
work of courts, where it must be remembered that a free citizen can
swiftly be placed into the disgrace and danger of a criminal dock, and
thence to prison.
In the ensuing years, I have come to understand that whether justice is achieved in individual cases turns not upon the strategies, theories and advocacy of the lawyers, but upon the common sense, labor,
courage, fair-mindedness, and honesty of policemen, witnesses, defense lawyers, prosecutors, judges and, most especially, jurors. This
has been the enduring lesson of my fifteen-year apprenticeship in the
trial courts. I learned it from a long line of shopkeepers, teachers,
welders, stockbrokers, street people, bus drivers, and captains of industry - persons from all walks of life, and of all races and classes.
Why does the jury system work so well? First, virtually all jurors
recognize and act upon the imperative that hard work and fair-mindedness are required in each matter, whether it be the obscure or the
great case. Second, and more directly, systematic thinking, a practice
only sporadically pursued in most collective activities, is imposed at
the outset by the formal and highly calibrated procedural requirements of evidence and, argument. Third, ( at least in New York) juries are almost inherently talented and diverse. Finally, American
courtrooms have not had about them the odor of a political agenda,
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or the aura of a circus maximus organized to glorify the players on the
evening newscasts. In short, the institutional credibility of the American jury trial has shown great depth and resonance.
What procedures produce good and dedicated juries? The answer
may be found in the voir dire process that, at its best, represents both
an appeal and an inquiry. When an ordinary citizen comes to court
and is convincingly told that, as an heir to Thomas Jefferson, he is
there to give renewed meaning to great humanist principles, and that
citizens like him in every city, town and village in America have been
doing that for more than two centuries, he will rise above his biases.
When he is convincingly told that the defendant in the dock has a
constitutional right to require his honorable, decent and fair-minded
hearing and judgment, he will rise above his biases. When such a
citizen is convincingly told that the integrity of the nation hangs upon
his honorable service, he will transcend his limitations and serve honorably. These are the appeals that must convincingly be made to ensure the integrity of the jury system.
The inquiry that follows must plainly stress the ruinous impact of
bias and prejudice upon the institution of impartial trial by jury. It
must relentlessly insist that prospective jurors internally search and
isolate biases, and acknowledge those biases privately to court and
counsel. The juror must be convincingly told that he or she is obligated under the Constitution not to serve if there exists even a shadow
of a possibility that bias might subtly (or even unconsciously) play
any role in his or her participation in the case. Potential jurors do in
fact disqualify themselves. Others are disqualified on a cause basis, as
a result of a rigorous, focused, skillful, and (if necessary) skeptical
inquiry by the judge and counsel at the side bar or in the robing room.
Once empaneled, the jury must often resist extraneous pressures on
its objectivity. The electronic media is now widely present in the
courtroom when notorious cases are litigated. The nation (or at least
that portion which is fixed to its television sets and is statistically expanded by sophisticated polling) becomes a jury of the whole. Understanding this, lawyers and partisans of the parties (and sometimes
interest groups) seek to (and do) condition prospective and sitting ju.rors during the pretrial period and the course of the trial. This conditioning is directed to both anticipated and admitted evidence.
Sometimes it goes even further, explicitly invoking and exploiting biases in efforts to derail the result adverse to the exploiter. The eye of
the television camera is the medium through which this drama unfolds, and it is exceedingly difficult for the court to control. The magnitude of courthouse television in terms of its scope, reach, and
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intensity, is immensely greater than that of a print reporter with a
notepad. Since cases become notorious largely as a result of media
coverage, the Orwellian eye of the camera can influence the case as a
fact finder collateral to the jury. It examines and judges witnesses,
usually through named or unnamed surrogates of the adversary, expresses skepticism or belief of evidence, claims, and defenses, and almost invariably presents a fragmented rather than an integrated
''snap shot" of the record.

Prior to selection of a jury, this pervasive exposure of a notorious
case must ipso facto condition those who are later summoned to jury
duty. After the case begins, non-sequestered jurors will be exposed to
the case in the theater of tabloid and television coverage, regardless of
the best of intentions. Courthouses, and sometimes even jury boxes
and deliberation rooms, may become targets of "re-education" by the
crude manipulation of crowd massing in the service of racial politics.
Courts will, of course, strive to advise jurors to forthrightly disclose
any out of court exposure to the matters implicated in the case on trial
before them. The more difficult question is whether courts can conclude with sufficient confidence that the juror has not been subtly or
subconsciously affected by such exposure, especially where racially
charged factual elements are present in the case or its coverage. As a
result, courts will likely be required to resort to jury sequestration
more frequently in such cases.
In the immediate post-verdict period, jurors in notorious cases
often come under intense media pressure to submit to interviews on
both their deliberations and subjective feelings about the case. It is
not uncommon for their homes or work places to be staked out by the
press. We have all winced and felt empathy for average citizens, fresh
from the jury box, being assailed on television programs like ABC's
Nightline by questions from glib lawyers and facile commentators that
sometimes evoke confusion, incoherence or truculence.
Under such stressful circumstances, it is hardly surprising that
large numbers of Americans might naturally impeach the outcome of
jury verdicts rendered in notorious cases, whether or not the race factor is overtly implicated. Furthermore, it is the prominent, not the
obscure case, which engages the attention of the public, and it is by
such cases that our judicial standards are assessed. Of course, where
jurors seek self-aggrandizing media exposure to personally profit from
their jury service, trial by jury is severely impugned. The damage
caused by such conduct cannot readily be repaired, because of the
magnification factor in such cases. Average Americans see their
courts and Constitution demeaned by such behavior, and to the extent
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that such base conduct is encouraged by journalists, publishers or motion picture companies, they exacerbate the injury.
What may be done to address these conspicuous dangers to trial by
jury in criminal cases, which often spawn skepticism in the public at
large about the integrity of jury verdicts in notorious cases? Courts
must redouble efforts to expose bias and prejudice in painstaking, exhaustive and deliberate questioning of jurors in the empaneling process. Once selected, jurors must be constantly reminded of their
position and obligations as surrogates for the community at large, and
to keep their service free from any impugning influence or taint. The
sequestration power must be resorted to more commonly, in spite of
public cost and its impact on the private lives of the jurors. Judges
ought not fail to caution jurors, when they are being discharged from
service, of the pitfalls and controversy often associated with post-trial
public statements by trial jurors in notorious cases.
Finally, it is the responsibility of the commentators, those reporting
directly from the courtroom and those observing criminal proceedings, to examine -

and if convinced, confirm -

the objectivity and

fairness of American trial juries generally. If they can find and report
upon what we in our courtrooms see and admire daily as American
juries go about their tasks honorably and decently, then the jury shall
remain, as it should, a peerless instrument in the defense of liberty.

